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Summary
In the last quarter century, Asia has become home to four modernizing nuclear weapon powers (China, India, 
Pakistan, and North Korea) and is now the epicenter of the “second nuclear age.” There is a growing belief 
that China and India’s growing geopolitical rivalry in the Indo-Pacific region alongside their efforts to build 
diverse and sophisticated deterrent forces could potentially produce security dilemmas and arms race spirals 
similar to the one that enveloped the superpower rivalry during the Cold War. Although the China–I ndia 
rivalry has received serious attention from scholars, the nuclear competition in their relationship has not. As 
a result, large gaps exist in our understanding of the China–India nuclear equation. 
This Insight expands our understanding of the China–India nuclear relationship by incorporating standard 
bean counting practices with Chinese and Indian thinking on nuclear weapons. It reviews the open source lit-
erature on the evolving view of national security managers in both countries on operational planning concern-
ing the deployment and use of nuclear weapons. More specifically, this Insight examines the convergences 
and divergences between civilian and military policy planners, the contending logics behind their approaches, 
the contradictions that remain unresolved, and the areas of ambiguity that spell uncertainty in operational 
policy. It concludes on the basis of the available data that although there is reason for concern, the case for 
nuclear pessimism in the China–India nuclear dyad is overstated. 
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aPPraISINg the ChINa–INDIa NuClear rIvalry  
IN the “SeCOND NuClear age”
In the last quarter century, Asia has become home 
to four modernizing nuclear weapon powers: China, 
India, Pakistan, and North Korea. As a consequence 
of this development, it is now the epicenter of the 
“second nuclear age” (Tellis 2013). Since the early 
1990s, China has ended its anemic pace of nuclear 
modernization and for the first time in five decades 
is on the verge of acquiring a credible second- strike 
capability against the United States and Russia. 
Farther south, India and Pakistan are rapidly develo-
ping operational arsenals. And after a decade of trial 
and error, there are now signs that North Korea may 
finally be capable of deploying operational warheads 
on ballistic missiles (Sanger 2014). 
Chinese nuclear modernization is of increasing in-
terest to scholars and policy makers because of 
China’s rise as a great power and the challenge it 
poses to US hegemony in the twenty first century. 
The India–Pakistan rivalry rouses concerns because 
of the likelihood of a conventional war in South Asia 
with nuclear overtones. And North Korea’s nuclear 
developments command attention because of the 
unpredictability of its regime and the possibility of 
internal state collapse. 
The China–India nuclear dyad, however, has re-
ceived little analytic attention. This is somewhat sur-
prising because there is growing awareness among 
scholars as well as policy makers of an unfolding 
and intensifying geopolitical rivalry between the 
two countries. This rivalry is rooted in both geopo-
litical concerns that relate to borders, the security of 
the sea-lanes of communications, and military as-
sistance to third parties, as much as in China and 
India’s self-i dentification as peer competitors and 
regional hegemonic powers. 
Several reasons could possibly explain why the 
C hina–India dyad has received such little attention 
in the past. One is China’s nuclear fixation with the 
United States, Russia, and Northeast Asia. A second 
is that, until recently, China’s preferred solution for 
dealing with a potential Indian nuclear threat was 
to deal with it indirectly by helping Pakistan acquire 
matching capabilities. A third is that although India 
has historically professed the China threat, yet until 
about the middle of the last decade, the technical 
and operational focus of its nuclear arsenal develop-
ment was Pakistan and not China. 
Because of this lack of serious analytic attention, 
there exist large gaps in our understanding of the 
China–India nuclear equation. When observing it, 
scholars and policy makers therefore generally tend 
to superimpose military bean-counting methods on 
geopolitical trends to arrive at threat estimates. These 
include estimates of fissile material, warhead inven-
tories, and extant or planned delivery systems. These 
are combined with states’ declaratory postures and 
use policy to arrive at a more rounded understanding 
of the nature of the phenomenon. Although useful, 
bean counting and declaratory statements constitute 
a relatively passive method of threat assessment. 
They tell us little about the intellectual, institutional, 
and organizational processes that produced those 
structural outcomes. 
This paper expands our understanding of the China–
India nuclear relationship. It attempts this by incor-
porating the standard bean-counting practices with 
Chinese and Indian thinking on nuclear weapons 
as political and military instruments. It reviews the 
open source literature on the evolving view of na-
tional security managers in both countries on opera-
tional planning concerning the deployment and use 
of nuclear weapons. More specifically, this paper ex-
amines the convergences and divergences between 
civilian and military policy planners, the contending 
logics behind their approaches, the contradictions 
that remain unresolved, and the areas of ambiguity 
that spell uncertainty in operational policy. 
It proceeds in four parts. The first part situates the 
China–India nuclear rivalry within the broader geo-
political competition between the two countries 
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in the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean regions. 
Next, it reviews their current nuclear modernization 
programs. Third, it outlines and analyzes the new 
C hinese and Indian thinking on nuclear weapons 
use and operations planning. In the fourth and final 
section, it analyzes China and India’s operational 
postures and the anchors behind stability and insta-
bility in their nuclear equation. 
Four conclusions emerge from this study. 
First, Chinese and Indian decision makers share an 
understanding that nuclear weapons are political 
instruments that best serve the purpose of vacat-
ing threats and intimidation on the part of nuclear 
adversaries. Political leaders who hold the final de-
cision-making authority in both countries are averse 
to ideas of nuclear war fighting with the result that 
nuclear modernization efforts are modest and finite. 
Second, civilian scientists and technocratic elites in 
both states play a strong role in shaping the arsenal’s 
development. Historically, they have preferred tech-
nological determinism, demonstration, and playing 
catch-up with the more advanced nuclear weapon 
powers to the operational requirements of their 
armed forces. Symbolism, however, is now giving 
way to numbers, engineering reliability, and opera-
tional demands. The militaries in both states now 
play a more influential role in the planning and the 
operational aspects of the nuclear arsenal. However, 
civilian leaders exercise firm institutional control 
over the militaries and the latter constitute only one 
voice within the institutional collective that shapes 
policy. 
Third, there is growing disenchantment within the 
militaries in both countries with politically deter-
mined “no-first-use” (NFU) doctrines. Both the 
C hinese and Indian militaries also share a propen-
sity for developing operational doctrines that discard 
simple retaliatory for limited deterrent postures. 
Thus far, however, the political leaderships in both 
countries have warded off efforts to end NFU. But 
the move toward operational forces is increasing 
pressures for the adoption of limited war fighting 
doctrines. Although the latter strengthens deter-
rence credibility, it also lowers the bar for potential 
nuclear weapons use in the future. 
Finally, despite operational pressures to discard 
NFU and adopt more complex limited deterrence 
postures, the geopolitical competition between 
China and India is not sufficiently intense to warrant 
alarm. Both China and India have marginally revi-
sionist global agendas. Their regional rivalry on the 
other hand does not pose existential security dilem-
mas likely to trigger arms race spirals of the type that 
consumed the superpowers during the Cold War. 
nature oF the chIneSe–IndIan geoPolItIcal rIvalry In aSIa
ChINeSe threat PerCePtIONS
The China–India rivalry has long been conside-
red a “civil” rivalry (Smith 2014, 3). Despite the 
1962 border war, in the subsequent decades both 
China and India have successfully avoided any 
further armed conflict. Occasional border intru-
sions, stand offs, posturing, and minor skirmishes 
notwithstanding, for over five decades the two sides 
have successfully managed an otherwise uneasy 
relationship, buttressed by a string of confidence-
building measures and negotiated agreements and 
understandings to avoid armed clashes and resolve 
the border dispute peacefully. 
Given the asymmetry of power, both economic and 
military that clearly favors China, scholars such as 
Susan Shirk, for example, have characterized the 
China–India rivalry as “one sided” because power 
asymmetries in the relationship cause New Delhi 
to perceive threats from China rather than the re-
verse (Shirk 2004, 75–76). Such characteriza-
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tions notwithstanding, the evidence shows that the 
threat environment between the two states is more 
perverse. The surface calm conceals a deep sense 
of foreboding and rivalry that pervades the C hina–
India relationship on both sides, amounting to 
what John Garver has described as a classic “secu-
rity dilemma” (Garver 2002, 1–3). This dilemma is 
rooted in structural geopolitical rationales as much 
as China and India’s self-identification as emerg-
ing hegemonic rivals in the Asia-Pacific. Indeed, as 
China and India become poised to emerge as the two 
largest economic powers after the United States and 
perhaps even displace the United States sometime 
in the middle of this century, the triangular relation-
ship between these three states could become the 
most important one in the near future.
There are three sources of Chinese unease and rival-
ry with India: (1) control over the Tibet Autonomous 
Region (TAR); (2) the security of the Sea-Lanes of 
Communications straddling the Indian Ocean region 
through which the bulk of Chinese global trade and 
energy supplies traverse; and (3) India’s participation 
in US plans to potentially contain or at least check 
Chinese power in Asia and the western Pacific.
Tibet
Despite controlling Tibet for nearly 400 years, 
sometimes in a superordinate manner and at other 
times nominally, China has become increasingly 
concerned that India could exploit domestic unrest 
in the TAR region and dilute or evict Beijing’s au-
thority, causing schisms in China’s national fabric. 
These concerns, for example, shaped Mao’s decision 
to force a decisive military showdown with India in 
1962 (Garver 2002, 6). Prior to that war, India for 
a while had insisted on retaining its special privileges 
in Tibet, a legacy of British imperialism. Even when 
India relinquished those privileges, it gave asylum 
to Tibet’s supreme religious leader, the 13th Dalai 
Lama, who fled Chinese repression and set up base 
in India (Malik 2011, 129). 
Subsequent to the 1962 India–China border war, 
India collaborated with the US to arm and train 
T ibetan insurgents in an attempt to weaken Chinese 
control over TAR (Garver 2007, 6–7). Today China 
fears that this strategy could be repeated when the 
current Dalai Lama passes from the scene and the 
issue of his succession becomes controversial in 
Tibet. The latter process could potentially trigger a 
revolt among an increasingly restive Tibetan popu-
lation. Chinese thinking assumes that insurgent 
T ibetan militias trained and armed by India, sup-
ported by Indian and US Special Forces, and backed 
by the Indian Air Force (IAF) could in theory threaten 
China’s control over the region (Garver 2002, 6–7). 
Scholars including Malik believe that Chinese anxi-
eties about the future of Tibet and the post-Dalai 
Lama succession are central to Beijing’s intransi-
gence over settling the border dispute with India. A 
broad survey of China’s border disputes with neigh-
bors and settlement deals shows that China has 
settled its border disputes with every other state but 
India. The rationale for this exception is a Chinese 
desire to retain leverage over India given the un-
certainty surrounding Tibet’s future (Malik 2011, 
136–58). 
Sea Lanes of Communications
A second underlying cause of the growing Chinese 
security dilemma is the security of the Sea Lanes 
of Communications that connect the South China 
Sea to the Indian Ocean region. Robert Kaplan has 
recently pointed out that South East Asia is the 
“demographic cockpit” of the world where 1.1 bil-
lion Chinese, 600 million South East Asians, and 
1.5 billion Indians converge (Kaplan 2014, 9). The 
South China Sea is also believed to sit atop oil re-
serves estimated at 130 billion barrels and gas re-
serves that could top 900 trillion cubic feet. These 
make it a veritable “second Persian Gulf” (Kaplan 
2014, 10). Rival claims to these oil and gas reserves 
are the reason for the intensifying rivalry in the South 
China Sea between China and its neighbors.
In addition, as the global economic center of grav-
ity in the last two decades has shifted to the Pacific 
Rim, the security of the sea-lanes in the region has 
assumed increasing importance. Ninety percent of 
the goods traded between continents are still moved 
via the sea. More specifically, about two-thirds of 
South Korea’s oil, 60 percent of Japan’s imports, 
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and 80 percent of China’s crude oil imports are 
transported via the South China Sea (Kaplan 2014, 
9–10; Smith 2014, 146–151). The sea-lanes con-
necting the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean 
have therefore become according to Kaplan the 
“throat,” the “connective tissue” whose security is 
vital to the continued expansion and prosperity of 
the Chinese economy. The South China Sea and 
its approaches from the Indian Ocean have turned 
into what the Caribbean was to US security interests 
in the late 19th and early 20th centuries (Kaplan 
2014, 13–14). 
India’s dominant geographic location in the Indian 
Ocean astride the Straits of Malacca, through which 
the bulk of China’s trade and energy supplies tra-
verse, provides India the default means for a choke-
hold over the Chinese economy. India’s attempt to 
actualize this potential is not without military, lo-
gistical, and political challenges that render it nearly 
impossible in practice (Collins and Murray 2008, 
79–93). But the theoretical possibility exists never-
theless and is sufficient to provoke China into plan-
ning a blue water navy capable of operating in the 
Western Pacific and the Indian Ocean against the 
United States and India. 
Unlike the Cold War in Europe in the last centu-
ry, this new rivalry in the South China Sea and the 
I ndian Ocean is not about ideology. All the regional 
powers in Asia are embedded in the global capital-
ist system and their domestic political systems are 
not in play. The new rivalry, however, is about se-
curing and expanding trade and business. Further, 
as K aplan frames it, unlike Central Europe (the 
ground zero of the Cold War) where land warfare 
remained the primary threat, in Asia the regional 
power rivalry is manifest through naval competition 
(Kaplan 2014, 15–16). The latter phenomenon is 
increasingly manifest in China, India, Vietnam, and 
A ustralia’s expanding defense expenditures and na-
val modernization programs. 
India as Part of the Anti-China Bandwagon
Finally, China is now deeply concerned about 
I ndia’s potential participation in a balancing coali-
tion against it in cooperation with the United States. 
Much to China’s surprise and structural interna-
tional relations theorists as well, US hegemony in 
the post-Cold War era has not invited counterbal-
ancing coalitions. States in the Asia-Pacific region 
have instead sought to bandwagon with the United 
States against Chinese power. Fifty years of US alli-
ance building, trade and military partnerships, global 
governance-centered public goods creation, trans-
parency and democratic decision-making at home, 
and geographic distance from the Asian mainland 
have made the US the natural go to state for states 
in the region concerned with China’s aggressive 
and rude attempts at regional hegemony (Ikenberry 
2014, 1–9). 
The US pivot to the Asia-Pacific under the Obama 
administration, the expanding naval cooperation, 
military exercises, and strategic dialogue between 
the US, India, Singapore, Japan, and Australia are 
viewed by China’s national security managers and 
strategic elites as the scaffoldings of a potential bal-
ancing coalition designed to contain China in the 
region (Smith 2014, 121–122). China views the 
2005 Indo–US nuclear cooperation agreement as 
the clearest marker of US attempts to remove hur-
dles in the expansion of Indian power and by ex-
tension create a passive and default mechanism to 
balance Chinese power in Asia (Smith 2014, 121). 
From the mid-2000s onward, the Indian military, 
especially its navy and air force, have become the 
largest participants in bilateral military exercises 
with their US counterparts outside NATO and other 
US alliance partnerships (Smith 2014, 120). Since 
then, India has also emerged as the largest buyer of 
US arms. As India alone among Asian powers pos-
sesses the structural means to emerge as China’s 
peer in Asia, Chinese policy planners see in the In-
dia–US relationship the potential foreshadowing of 
Containment 2.0. 
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INDIaN threat PerCePtIONS
In India, there are two views of the Chinese threat. 
The first, the liberal view, regards the threat as man-
ageable. Despite the rivalry and the security dilem-
mas that it generates, the liberals take a relatively 
b enign view of China. They argue that the China– 
India rivalry does not boil down to a “zero-sum” 
game but as one that involves absolute gains, espe-
cially in economic terms. The liberal view of China in 
India, however, is a minority one. India’s national se-
curity managers and the strategic elites at large view 
the China–India rivalry in terms of relative gains. 
They regard Chinese policies as instrumentally de-
signed to maintain strategic leverage over India, con-
tain it in South Asia, and prevent it from emerging as 
a great power in Asia and the world (Malik 2011, 
51–62). Three issues are of particular concern to 
I ndia’s national security managers: (1) the border 
dispute; (2) China’s attempts to divide India’s stra-
tegic attention; and (3) the emerging maritime rivalry 
in the Indian Ocean region. 
Unsettled Border Dispute
The unsettled border dispute with China remains a 
core Indian security concern. This dispute lies at the 
heart of the belief among India’s national security 
managers that China wishes to leave the border un-
settled as a means of retaining strategic leverage over 
India. According to Jeff Smith, negotiations on the 
border issue remain the longest that any two states 
have conducted on the subject in the post-World 
War II era (Smith 2014, 29). After eight rounds of 
border talks (1981–88), 14 rounds of Joint Work-
ing Group meetings (1989–2002), and 15 rounds 
of meetings between special representatives (2003–
2014), the border dispute seems farther from reso-
lution than ever (Smith 2014, 29–30). 
The high point of Chinese and Indian amicabil-
ity was reached in 2005, after which the border 
dispute once again flared up. On the positive side, 
both countries have agreed not to hold their over-
all relationship hostage to the border dispute (Smith 
2014, 30). In 1993, they signed the Agreement on 
the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility on the Line 
of Actual Control, which was followed in 1996 by 
the Agreement on Confidence Building Measures in the 
Military Field Along the Line of Actual Control. The 
first agreement commits the parties to the non-use 
of force and the use of peaceful means to resolve the 
border dispute (United Nations Peacemaker, 1993). 
The second reduces the presence of military forces 
along the line of actual control and restricts the scale 
of military exercises (United Nations Peacemaker, 
1996). The net result of both agreements has been 
the absence of any large military clashes between 
I ndia and China since 1967. 
Beneath these diplomatic agreements, however, ten-
sions have flared up again. India believes that China 
has backtracked on its commitment on the principles 
of border settlement that the two parties agreed to 
in 2005 and that Chinese leaders have boldly reas-
serted China’s claims over the disputed territories in 
India’s northeast (Smith 2014, 39–40). Likewise, 
Indian national security managers complain that 
China has dragged its feet on recognizing Sikkim’s 
accession to India even though India acquiesced to 
Chinese claims over Tibet (Malik 2011, 145–151). 
Further, China has embarked on a massive program 
of infrastructure development of roads and railways 
to connect Tibet to the western parts of China, ef-
forts that are likely to reinforce the People’s Libera-
tion Army’s (PLA) logistic advantage over the Indian 
military (Smith 2014, 41). 
Post-2005, India has responded similarly by tough-
ening its diplomatic posture against China. India is 
now no longer willing to reiterate its commitment 
to a “One China” policy in the absence of Chinese 
reciprocity over Indian claims in Kashmir (Madan 
2014). It has also ended its deference toward 
C hinese sensitivity over the Dalai Lama and allowed 
the latter and his regime greater political latitude that 
trespass on Chinese claims (Smith 2014, 93–94). 
Most significantly, India is responding to Chinese in-
frastructure improvements in Tibet with a massive 
military build-up of its own. This involves improve-
ments in the road network in the border regions of 
the northeast and the northwest (Katyal 2014), 
the raising of two new mountain infantry divisions 
( Patil 2013), the upgrading of airports, deployment 
of land attack cruise missiles, and the newest com-
10
© Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo 2014. ISSN 1894-4795
IFS Insights 3/2014 China–India nuclear rivalry in the “second nuclear age”
bat aircraft in the IAF’s inventory (Smith 2014, 42). 
The India–China border is now beset with heavy 
patrolling, intrusions, standoffs, and tensions that 
could trigger armed clashes in the future (Fairclough 
2014). 
Dividing Indian Strategic Attention
In the last three decades, China has feigned indiffer-
ence toward Indian power but has worked actively 
to confine it to South Asia (Tellis 2002, 137–145). 
It has achieved this by dividing Indian strategic at-
tention between two fronts (Pakistan and China) 
and by countervailing Indian power through the 
building of economic and strategic relations with its 
neighbors in South Asia (Smith 2014, 151–152). 
Pakistan in particular has emerged as China’s pri-
mary counterweight to India in the region. China’s 
“all weather r elationship” with Pakistan involves the 
supply of conventional arms (Malik 2011, 165–
188). But more critically, it has involved assistance 
to P akistan’s nuclear weapons and strategic deliv-
ery programs in the realm of weapon design, test-
ing, diagnostics, the sale of complete ballistic mis-
sile systems, and plants to manufacture them (Reed 
and Stillman 2009, 252–253). The sophistication 
of Pakistan’s nuclear operational planning and con-
fidence in its ability to execute nuclear operations 
suggests that Chinese assistance may be far more 
extensive than is publicly known. 
India’s national security managers are not only con-
cerned with the direct threats that Chinese prolif-
eration to Pakistan poses for India, but also for 
its indirect implications that are far more lethal. 
P akistan’s external policy toward India is driven by 
both revanchism and revisionism. Since the 1980s, 
P akistan has leveraged nuclear weapons to wage 
a low-intensity conventional war against India by 
training and arming insurgents in the Indian states of 
Punjab and then Kashmir (Kargil Review Committee 
Report 1999, 53–78). It has intervened directly as 
by its attempt to seize Indian territory in Kashmir’s 
Kargil heights in 1998–99 (Singh 1999). Likewise, 
P akistani based terrorist groups, many supported 
directly and indirectly by Pakistani intelligence agen-
cies, have waged terror attacks including the 2001 
attack on the Indian parliament (Dugger 2001), and 
the 2008 attack in Mumbai (Rotella 2013). 
Pakistan has used its nuclear arsenal as a shield from 
behind which to wage an undeclared asymmetric 
war against India. Its nuclear weapons program, 
aided by China, has immobilized Indian’s conven-
tional war machine. As a consequence, a regime of 
“ugly stability” has descended upon South Asia with 
frequent crises and occasional threats of war (Tellis, 
Fair, and Medby 2001). The direct cost of this ugly 
stability to India in terms of lives lost and financial 
outlays over three decades has been immense. But 
its geostrategic implications are even more profound. 
China has essentially become an indirect party to 
Pakistan’s strategy of a “thousand cuts” to bleed the 
Indian military. From the Indian national security 
managers’ point of view, Chinese nuclear prolifera-
tion assistance to Pakistan has created instability in 
the region and poisoned relations with China. 
Naval Rivalry in Indian Ocean Region
Finally, the increasing presence of the Chinese navy 
and regular patrols in the Indian Ocean region have 
become the third component of the India–China 
rivalry. Prior to the 21st century, both the People’s 
Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) and the Indian Navy 
(IN) lacked the capabilities and interests to conduct 
operations in the Indian Ocean and the South China 
Sea. But this is no longer the case. Given its increasing 
energy dependence on sea-based imports, China’s 
South Asia policy in the past 13 years has morphed 
into a broader Indian Ocean strategy (Smith 2014, 
146–155). As a consequence, China has assidu-
ously courted and established container terminals 
and allegedly listening posts and radar stations along 
the Indian Ocean littoral (Smith 2014, 151–152). 
Over time, these investments have proven to be eco-
nomic and not military. But China’s forays into the 
region has aroused concerns in I ndia that over time 
commercial investments could give way to negotiat-
ed access and support for the PLAN’s vessels of war. 
Just as the PLAN now has a semi-presence in the 
Indian Ocean region, the IN too has sent naval ves-
sels to participate in US-led exercises in the west-
ern Pacific (U.S. Dept. of Defense 2011). China in 
turn deploys naval vessels off the coast of East Africa 
to assist with anti-piracy operations (Erickson and 
Strange 2013). Chinese submarines also conduct 
patrols out of Hainan island and operate west of the 
11
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St. of Malacca, including that of a nuclear subma-
rine recently (Page 2014). Privately, Chinese mili-
tary officers assert that China is no longer willing to 
concede the Indian Ocean as India’s sphere of influ-
ence and the PLAN’s semi-permanent presence has 
breached India’s unofficial Monroe doctrine (Smith 
2014, 154–155). The naval rivalry between China 
and India is still in its formative stages. It is by no 
means certain if it will become inflated in the future. 
However, India’s development of a submarine-based 
nuclear deterrent and China’s submarine patrols, 
particularly the deployment of nuclear hunter-killer 
submarines in the Indian Ocean, is likely to cause 
incidents and raise tensions in the future. 
the nuclear dImenSIon
In the wake of India and Pakistan’s nuclear tests in 
1998, North Korea’s subsequent nuclear tests in 
2006, ’09, and ’13, and the continued development 
of operational arsenals in China, India and P akistan, 
it is generally accepted that the Asia-Pacific is now 
the epicenter of the “second nuclear age” (Tellis 
2013, 13–23). Many observers point to an appa-
rently three-way nuclear arms race between China, 
India and Pakistan although the motivations of the 
countries involved vary significantly. Historically, 
China’s nuclear arsenal development, its moderni-
zation, and attempts at operational improvements 
have been directed at the US, the US’s regional al-
lies in the Asia-Pacific, the former Soviet Union, and 
now Russia (Lewis 2013, 68–74). India has been 
a relatively marginal factor in Chinese nuclear con-
cerns. Chinese leaders and its military have sought to 
squander India’s strategic attention through nuclear 
assistance to Pakistan and have neither addressed 
its nuclear security concerns nor acknowledged its 
nuclear status. In the process, they have exacerbated 
India’s security dilemmas (Tellis 2002, 137–145). 
For India, China remains at the center of its nuclear 
security dilemma. India’s nuclear quest was trig-
gered by the humiliating defeat of its military during 
the 1962 war with China along the Himalayan bor-
der (Ganguly 1999, 151–153). Although India’s 
nuclear weapons program was largely passive until 
the early 1980s, its unsettled border with China, the 
occasional Chinese threats during crises and wars 
with Pakistan, and ultimately Chinese assistance to 
Pakistan remain causes for concern. The consensus 
in India is that the immediate nuclear threat to I ndia 
emanates from Pakistan. India’s military and its na-
tional security managers, however, view the longer-
term threat from China. India’s national security 
managers also express the fear that a border conflict 
could involve nuclear blackmail. China might at-
tempt to intimidate Indian leaders into abandoning 
claims by inducing a collapse of political will (Tellis 
2001, 58–75, 273–280). The Indian military and 
strategic elites are also unconvinced of China’s NFU 
pledge on grounds that it is unlikely to apply to terri-
tories China claims as its own or even disputed ones 
(Shankar 2010). Due to such fears, the long-term 
nuclear operational goals in India are geared toward 
deterring China. 
In the China–India nuclear dyad, power asymme-
tries clearly favor China. China has developed three 
generations of nuclear warheads – fission, thermo-
nuclear and enhanced radiation, has tested and may 
possess tactical nuclear weapons, has a four decade 
lead over India in the development, deployment, 
and operations of ballistic missiles as well as proce-
dures and training protocols for deployment and use 
of nuclear weapons. It also enjoys a three- decade 
lead in the development of a sea-based deterrent 
(K ristensen and Norris 2014). These technical and 
operational asymmetries notwithstanding, histori-
cally, both the Chinese and Indian programs have 
shared surprising convergences. 
Idiosyncratic leaderships
The nuclear weapon programs in both countries 
have been shaped by the ideological predilections 
of political leaders at the very top. In China, Mao 
and later Deng Xiaoping, imposed a political logic 
on the program (Fravel and Medeiros 2010, 51). In 
India the Nehru-Gandhis and their successors in the 
prime minister’s office have done the same (Basrur 
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2001, 181–198). The political leaderships in 
both countries have embraced the idea that nuclear 
weapons, because of their scale of destruction, are 
unusable in war, which makes them political weap-
ons. They have therefore felt the need to avoid the 
runaway nuclear upmanship of the sort pursued by 
the superpowers during the Cold War. Leaderships 
in both countries have believed that a small nuclear 
deterrent and the prospect of assured retaliation is 
very likely sufficient to vacate nuclear threats from 
a stronger adversary (Fravel and Medeiros 2010, 
51; Basrur 2001, 181–198). Above all, they have 
regarded nuclear weapons as symbols of prestige, 
means to close the capability and technological gaps 
with other great powers in the international system 
(Lewis 2013, 68–71; Perkovich 1999, 445–450). 
Technological determinism
Historically, arsenal development in both countries 
was and is still is led by technocratic elites. Chinese 
warhead designs and ballistic missile developments 
were driven by scientific and technological impera-
tives to test and develop newer systems and close 
the gap with the great powers in the international 
system (Lewis 2013, 69–71). In India too, the sci-
entific elites in the past have preferred to develop 
“technology demonstrators” to operational systems 
(Kampani 2003, 56–58). The political leaderships 
in both countries have remained sympathetic to this 
technocratic view of the scientists. The latter’s en-
trenchment within decision-making institutions has 
overshadowed the military’s user-related demands. 
As a result, until recently, there existed large op-
erational gaps in both Chinese and Indian nuclear 
c apabilities. 
Weak role of militaries in operational planning
Because of the command of the scientific- 
technological community in giving direction to nu-
clear weapon programs and delivery capabilities, as 
well as the dominance of the civilian leaderships who 
have sought to impose their top-down political view 
of nuclear weapons, the professional militaries, un-
like the cases of other nuclear weapon powers, until 
recently played a marginal role in planning the use 
of nuclear weapons. Until the late 1980s, China’s 
Second Artillery Corps (SAC), the agency tasked with 
the custody and use of nuclear weapons, lacked in-
stitutional capacities to develop a serious operational 
capability (Fravel and Medeiros 2010, 51–52). In 
India’s case as well, the military remained until the 
last decade, shut out of operational plans on nucle-
ar weapons (Kampani 2013, 106–109). Hence, 
China, until the late 1980s and possibly even the 
mid-1990s possessed a truly minimal retaliatory 
capability (Fravel and Medeiros 2010, 53–55). In 
India’s case as well, until the last decade, nuclear 
weapons were not embedded into soft institutional 
and organizational routines that could give India a 
true use capability (Kampani 2014, 81–82). 
Emphasis on Operationalization
Both China and India, however, are becoming in-
creasingly cognizant of the challenges of opera-
tionalization. In China’s case, the realization has 
dawned that its capabilities suffer from serious lacu-
nae – both hardware and institutional-organizational 
– that leave it dangerously vulnerable to a first strike 
by the United States and Russia. Among other fac-
tors, the passing away of idiosyncratic strongmen, 
the growing professionalization of the PLA, espe-
cially the SAC, the greater availability of funds, and 
the maturing of technological programs launched in 
the 1980s and 1990s have added to the push for 
better operational capabilities (Lewis and Xue 2012, 
45–62). India’s stepping out of its nuclear closet in 
1998 and formal claims to nuclear status have also 
produced a realization among its national security 
managers that India must develop operational capa-
bilities because its nuclear adversaries assume that 
it possesses such capabilities and will proceed to act 
on that assumption during a future crisis or war. In 
addition, the growing institutionalization of the pro-
fessional military’s role in policy planning has also 
led to the realization that symbolic capabilities are 
likely to produce deterrence failures (Karnad 2008, 
83–105). 
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chIna
hIStOrICal SOurCeS Of ChINeSe reStraINt
In comparison to its nuclear peers, China’s arsenal 
has remained small and crude. Until 2008 it was 
estimated to consist of no more than 151 nuclear 
warheads. The core of the arsenal remains a small 
force of land-based mobile ballistic missiles (Fravel 
and Medeiros 2010, 54). Chinese nuclear bomb-
ers are obsolete and its “boomer” submarine fleet is 
believed to operate without its complement of bal-
listic missiles (Jeremy 2014). Until about a decade 
and a half ago, China primarily deployed liquid-fuel 
engine missiles that required long and laborious 
preparations for launch (Lewis and Di 1992, 5–40). 
Warheads were and are still stored separately from 
the missile systems (Stokes 2010). Similarly, until 
the late 1980s, China had a skeletal early warning 
system to warn of an impending nuclear attack and 
its command and control connectivity was consid-
ered fragile (Mulvenon and Yang 2003, 193–208). 
These conditions left the Chinese arsenal highly 
vulnerable to a pre-emptive attack. Since the early 
1990s, China has sought to modernize its arsenal as 
well as institute more robust operational practices. 
But scholars and policy practitioners have puzzled 
over China’s historical inattention to its nuclear force 
as well as the future direction of its force moderniza-
tion and operational profile. 
Despite the limited availability of Chinese source 
materials and data, scholars have pieced together 
the evidence that very likely explains this puzzling 
behavior. Their evidence and explanations cover ide-
ational, structural, and institutional factors and also 
offer clues to the future direction of China’s nuclear 
trajectory. 
From 1964 when China tested its first nuclear 
weapon until the ascent of the third generation of 
Chinese leaders in the 1990s, the nuclear arsenal 
was shaped by the views of China’s strongmen: Mao 
and Deng Xiaoping. Both leaders and their top cohort 
believed that nuclear weapons served the purpose 
of deterring their use by others, that such weapons 
were generally unusable for war fighting purposes, 
and that China needed a small arsenal to close the 
technical gap with its peers in the international sys-
tem. Nuclear weapons for this generation of China’s 
leadership served the purposes of symbolism and 
deterrence. Although Chinese leaders such as Mao 
and Marshal Nie Rongzhen did spell out the political 
principles of nuclear policy – NFU and assured re-
taliation – they did not issue directives to the military 
on operational policy (Lewis and Xue 2012, 47). 
It is not atypical for political leaders to not delve into 
operational aspects of military policy. That task is 
generally the domain of professional militaries. In 
China, however, this did not happen until the late 
1980s as the PLA was caught up in the turmoil of 
the Cultural Revolution from 1966 until 1976. The 
PLA’s academic and officer training institutions, the 
Academy of Military Sciences and the Military Affairs 
Academy ceased to function and an entire genera-
tion of military officers was left formally unschooled 
in military affairs, strategy, and doctrine. The after-
shocks of the Cultural Revolution reverberated in the 
PLA well into the 1980s and caused severe damage 
to Chinese military institutions (Fravel and Medeiros 
2010, 51–52). 
In this institutional vacuum, information relating to 
the state of the nuclear weaponization program was 
compartmentalized and confined to a small group 
of political leaders within the Chinese Communist 
Party and weapon scientists. This coterie of weapon 
scientists and technologists assumed a predominant 
role in giving direction to the Chinese arsenal. They 
interpreted Mao and Deng’s political principles to 
favor technical advances over operational require-
ments of the PLA’s General Staff Department (Lewis 
2013, 69–71). All information concerning the nu-
clear weapons program and its related delivery sys-
tems was cocooned in an intense regime of secrecy. 
Given such tightly restricted information flows, the 
PLA and its Second Artillery, the agency formally 
entrusted with the nuclear deterrent, had few in-
stitutional means to plan for an operational nuclear 
strategy (Fravel and Medeiros 2010, 70–71). 
The technical determinism in the Chinese nuclear 
arsenal’s development became apparent in several 
ways. For example, China developed and tested an 
enhanced radiation warhead (neutron bomb) in the 
1980s as well as tactical nuclear weapons but has 
allegedly not deployed either (Lewis 2013, 70–71; 
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Johnston 1995–96, 34–35). Similarly engineering 
improvements were incorporated in the small fam-
ily of land-based ballistic missiles. These improve-
ments, however, did not translate into an increase 
in deployed numbers of these missiles (Lewis 2013, 
70–71). In the 1980s, the development of the sea-
based arsenal was suspended and money diverted 
for computing and space travel (Lewis 2013, 70). In 
doing so, the technologists and the political leaders 
hoped to galvanize China’s high-tech industry and 
close the gap with the more advanced technological 
powers. In essence, the PLA’s Second Artillery was 
tasked with managing the nuclear arsenal. But it was 
not tasked with force planning or determining the 
size and shape of the force on the basis of its opera-
tional requirements. 
the ShIft frOm teChNOlOgICal DetermINISm tO mODerNIzatION  
aND OPeratIONal PlaNNINg
Starting in the late 1980s and early 1990s Chinese 
military strategy began to change with a new em-
phasis on the modernization of the Second Artillery 
Corps. Unlike China’s first and second-generation 
leaders, the third-generation realized the signifi-
cance of high- technology in modern warfare show-
cased so spectacularly by US successes in the first 
Persian Gulf War. The advent of precision-strike, 
surveillance, and information dominance technolo-
gies and doctrines that enveloped them institution-
ally and organizationally not only threatened China’s 
obsolete conventional military, it highlighted the 
grave implications for its nuclear force survivability, 
strategic connectivity, and command and control 
(Lewis 2013, 71; Lewis and Xue 2012, 50–51). 
With the Cultural Revolution behind, there was 
a renewed emphasis on professional training and 
education in the PLA and its SAC. And as China’s 
economic successes during the 1980s and 1990s 
made larger defense budgets possible, the focus 
within SAC shifted to hardware modernization and 
operational planning. 
Hardware
The primary developments in China’s nuclear hard-
ware modernization in the last two decades are 
the replacement of liquid-engine with solid-motor 
missiles and a serious attempt at developing a sub-
marine-based ballistic missile force. Starting in the 
early 1990s, the DF-21, a two stage solid-fuel road 
mobile missile began replacing the oldest missile in 
the Chinese inventory, the DF-3A. The nuclear ver-
sion of the DF-21 comes in two models, A and B, 
with ranges of 1,750km and 2,150km respectively 
and the missile carries a single 200-300kt warhead. 
The DF-21 is China’s primary weapon targeted at 
regional powers including India. A third ‘C’ model 
of the DF-21deploys conventional warheads and is 
primarily aimed at Taiwan (Kristensen and Norris 
2013, 80–81). But given the missile’s mobility, it 
could easily be re-deployed against Indian targets. 
China also began deploying a second missile, the 
DF-31, in 2006. The DF-31 is a three-stage solid- 
motor system with a 7,000km-range. It is believed to 
be the primary weapon that would be used to target 
regional rivals such as Russia and India (K ristensen 
and Norris 2013, 81). A still longer-range DF-31A 
(11,000km-range) currently being developed will 
very likely target the United States. Thus far, US 
intelligence agencies have counted a small number 
of launchers associated with the DF-31 and the 
missile is believed to deploy a single 200–300kt 
warhead (Kristensen and Norris 2013, 81–82). US 
intelligence agencies believe that China is capable 
of developing a multiple independently targetable 
re-entry vehicle (MIRV) and maneuverable re-entry 
vehicle (MARV) capability for its ICBMs and may be 
developing a MIRV capability for its road mobile DF-
31A (OSD 2013, 31). The multiple warhead capa-
bility will permit the incorporation of decoys on the 
missile to defeat the US missile defense system. The 
use of decoys, however, will increase the payload of 
the missile and reduce its range. The consequences 
of heavier payload and reduced range, while likely to 
produce negative trade-offs in the China–US nuclear 
dyad, will not have similar negative implications for 
Chinese targeting plans against India.
In addition to the land ballistic missile fleet, China 
has developed a 1,500km-range land attack cruise 
missile, the DH-10, which can be launched from a 
mobile launcher. China is also believed to be devel-
oping an air-launched version of the DH-10 that 
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could be deployed on the H-6 bomber (Kristensen 
and Norris 2013, 82). The US air force and intel-
ligence agencies judge the cruise missiles to be con-
ventional and nuclear capable and China is believed 
to have tested a warhead for cruise missiles in 1995 
(Kristensen and Norris 2013, 83). This system pro-
vides China a flexible albeit limited nuclear attack 
capability against India. 
Finally, China is seriously pursuing a sea-based 
ballistic missile capability. The current and only 
Xia-class nuclear submarine armed with JL-1 bal-
listic missiles is slated for retirement soon. It is in 
the process of being replaced by three Type 094 or 
Jin class submarines, which are currently operating 
without their missile complements. Each submarine 
is expected to deploy 12 JL-2 missiles (OSD 2013, 
6). The JL-2 was tested in 2012 and is similar to the 
DF-31 (OSD 2013, 31). It has an estimated range 
of 7,400km and may come with penetration aids or 
possibly carry a single warhead. The Type 094/Jin-
class submarines will in theory provide China with 
a secure second-strike capability against regional 
powers such as Russia and India and against the 
US in the Western Pacific. US intelligence agencies 
believe that China will likely build a total of five sub-
marines of the Type 094 class before developing the 
next generation Type 096 submarines in the next 
decade (OSD 2013, 6). 
Nuclear Operations and Use Strategy
Although the key elements of Chinese nuclear 
policy are well known in public, until recently little 
was known about the Chinese military’s opera-
tional nuclear strategy. Policy entails the political 
principles that govern China’s nuclear forces. The 
stated e lements of Chinese nuclear policy include 
the acquisition of nuclear weapons solely for de-
fensive purposes, the political commitment not to 
use nuclear weapons first against a nuclear adver-
sary, resolve against threatening nuclear use against 
non-nuclear weapon states and nuclear-free zones, 
the assurance not to proliferate nuclear weapons to 
other countries or deploy nuclear weapons abroad 
(Lewis and Xue 2013, 46–47). Operational policy 
on the other hand consists of the principles and pro-
cedures regarding the storage, safety, deployment, 
maintenance, alerting, and firing of nuclear weap-
ons. It concerns strategic connectivity between the 
national command authorities and the military lead-
ership and most importantly how China proposes to 
use nuclear weapons during crises and wars.
In the history of China’s nuclear arsenal develop-
ment, operational aspects of policy only began to 
gain importance from the late 1980s and early 
1990s onward. This was the consequence of do-
mestic institutional reforms, the training and insti-
tutional development that created the means for the 
Second Artillery to think through operational aspects 
of policy (Lewis 2013, 71). The institutional reforms 
and growing professionalization has led to a debate 
within the Chinese military and its national security 
managers over the operational aspects of deterrence, 
particularly “minimal” versus “limited” deterrence 
and the retention of China’s historic NFU policy 
(Johnston 1995, 5–42). 
The Second Artillery established an academic re-
search office at the headquarters level for the first 
time in 1978 and issued the “Science of Second 
Artillery Campaigns” in the early 1980s, which 
scholars believe constitutes its first major study on 
nuclear weapons after China exploded a nuclear de-
vice in 1964 (Fravel and Medeiros 2010, 67; Lewis 
and Xue 2012, 48). Until 1987, however, the Sec-
ond Artillery lacked a comprehensive and integrated 
operational nuclear strategy (Lewis and Xue 2012, 
48). In 1987 it published the “The Science of Mili-
tary Strategy” which is regarded as the PLA’s first 
comprehensive text in the post-1949 era on mili-
tary and nuclear strategy (Lewis and Xue 2012, 48; 
Fravel and Medeiros 2010, 68). 
Although the nuclear aspects of this “operational 
text” exclusively focused on China’s handling of a 
Soviet nuclear strike, it laid down the central tenets 
of China’s operational nuclear doctrine, namely: (a) 
deterring a nuclear attack; and (b) absorbing a nucle-
ar attack and then launching a counterstrike through 
means of assured retaliation. This text highlights 
the constraints placed on China’s operational capa-
bilities by the small size of its arsenal, and a growing 
awareness for increased numbers. The PLA’s grow-
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ing nuclear sophistication becomes evident from the 
emphasis on achieving better effectiveness, which 
is the sum of warhead miniaturization, penetrabil-
ity of the delivery system, and overall systems reli-
ability (Fravel and Medeiros 2010, 69–70). Despite 
China’s political emphasis that nuclear weapons are 
instruments of deterrence and not war fighting, yet 
by the late 1980s there are hints in the Chinese use 
strategy of the blurring of distinctions between coun-
terforce1 and countervalue2 targets and a stress on 
counterforce attacks on an enemy’s military as well 
as economic power centers (Lewis and Xue 2012, 
59). 
In 1993, the Central Military Commission (CMC) 
under China’s third generation leadership led by 
J iang Zemin issued new directives to the PLA to de-
velop principles for fighting and winning “local wars” 
under “high-technology conditions” (Lewis and Xue, 
51). Each of the services including the Second Ar-
tillery developed operational plans. The new guide-
lines for nuclear operations were completed by the 
early 2000s. Like their 1987 predecessor, these 
new guidelines emphasize “close defense” and “key 
point counterstrikes.” (Fravel and Medeiros 2010, 
76–77) The former concerns force protection and 
survivability through mobility and concealment. 
The latter concerns China’s retaliatory policy, which 
is a combination of counterforce and countervalue 
strikes. The goal of the Chinese military is to shock a 
nuclear adversary into capitulating and de- escalating 
a conflict. By the mid-2000s Chinese military pub-
lications also make clear that China’s goal is to de-
velop a “lean and effective” nuclear force and they 
reiterate its NFU nuclear use doctrine (Fravel and 
Medeiros 2010, 77). 
From the late 1980s and early 1990s a debate has 
raged within the Chinese military on whether China 
should continue with Mao’s traditional “minimum” 
deterrence posture or whether it should adopt a more 
ambitious “limited deterrence” posture. A useful 
definition of minimum deterrence is that it “threat-
ens the lowest level of damage necessary to prevent 
attack with the fewest numbers of nuclear weapons 
possible.” (Fravel and Medeiros 2010, 50) The de-
terminants of minimum deterrence are the ability to 
conduct undifferentiated attacks against counterval-
ue targets, a small and finite arsenal, and relatively 
unsophisticated command and control. A limited 
deterrence posture on the other hand entails “limit-
ed war fighting capability to inflict costly damage on 
the adversary at every rung on the escalation ladder, 
thus denying the adversary victory in a nuclear war.” 
(Fravel and Medeiros 2010, 50) It demands larger, 
more diverse and sophisticated nuclear forces with 
multiplication of delivery systems and warheads, a 
robust command and control, civilian defense, and 
the ability of the military to conduct sustained and 
repeated nuclear attacks. 
Chinese analysts distinguish “minimal” and “limit-
ed” deterrence postures from “maximalist” postures 
of the type pursued by the US and the former Soviet 
Union during the Cold War. A maximalist posture 
entails capabilities that allow the execution of a dis-
arming first strike aimed at counterforce targets and 
sustained war fighting (Johnston 1995, 18). They 
reject this because of its cost, technical complexity, 
and the hegemonic principles it signifies. But be-
tween nuclear minimalism and limited postures, they 
favor the latter. The PLA’s preference has to do with 
the growing realization that (a) minimal capabilities 
are vulnerable to a pre-emptive attack; (b) that crude 
countervalue targeting does not help in either con-
trolling escalation or achieving intra-war deterrence; 
and (c) that deterrence is actually achieved when the 
deterring party signals a will to be able to fight a nu-
clear war. The latter is more likely when the deterring 
party possess the ability to initiate nuclear attacks 
across a spectrum of violence ranging from tactical 
to strategic nuclear use (Johnston 1995, 17–18). 
The debate on a limited posture has also become 
enmeshed with another, on whether China should 
abandon its historic adherence to NFU or alterna-
tively dilute it by qualifying it. The rationale once 
again is that NFU leaves China vulnerable (John-
ston 1995, 21). Alongside these debates are also 
attempts in what Ian Johnston dubs the Sinification 
of nuclear strategy. Following the ancient Chinese 
military strategist Sun Tzu’s maxim that the most ef-
ficient victory is the one that results from a war never 
fought, Chinese military professionals often favor the 
coercive elements of nuclear strategy either politi-
cally or in military operations (Johnston 1995, 17). 
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Thus alongside China’s actual targeting plans, there 
is ambiguity on whether China proposes to launch 
nuclear forces under attack, or under circumstances 
when it claims it is fighting on its (or disputed) ter-
ritory, or when it receives intelligence that a nuclear 
attack is imminent.
Western experts generally agree however that there 
is a vast gap between these doctrinal debates and 
China’s ability to execute more ambitious nuclear 
operations. Optimists argue that Chinese warheads 
and delivery systems are not increasing to numbers 
that would signify the transition to a limited deter-
rent posture. China at best is improving the mobil-
ity, range, reliability, and survivability of its nuclear 
forces by building a new generation of delivery sys-
tems. This fits in with a minimal deterrence posture. 
Similarly, China’s nuclear command and control 
and relatively weak strategic connectivity is another 
indicator of its minimalist posture. Nor has China 
likely deployed tactical nuclear or enhanced ra-
diation weapons that would suggest nuclear battle 
fighting capabilities (Fravel and Medeiros 2010, 
81–82; Johnston 1995, 31–35). The PLA has 
however conducted exercises since the mid-1950s 
simulating war under battlefield nuclear conditions. 
But China is believed to possess limited data on 
the effects of battlefield nuclear weapons (J ohnston 
1995, 27–28, 34–35). What all this evidence 
likely suggests is that China’s civilian leadership has 
reasserted control over the military and rejected the 
limited nuclear posture in favor of China’s historic 
minimalist stance. However, it could well be that 
China’s posture toward the US is minimalist while 
its improving force capabilities in the future will per-
mit it to maintain a limited deterrent posture toward 
regional rivals including India. 
IndIa
hIStOrICal SOurCeS Of INDIaN reStraINt
Although India has embarked upon an ambitious 
attempt to develop an operational nuclear arsenal 
in the last fifteen years, a series of structural con-
straints have created powerful path dependent ef-
fects, which place overall limits on the scope of its 
program. These constraints, like that of its Chinese 
counterpart, have to do with the ideological predilec-
tions of India’s political leadership, the predominant 
role of civilian scientists who favor technical dem-
onstrations over operational systems, the stymieing 
institutional effects of excessive secrecy, and the 
limited role of the military in operational planning. 
Although the Indian military now has a larger role in 
shepherding the nuclear arsenal, like China’s SAC, 
it shares this role with a host of other actors, which 
limits its autonomy in policy planning. 
Indian political leaders have accepted a primarily 
political role for nuclear weapons as against a war 
fighting one. From 1989–1993 when India first ac-
quired nuclear weapons, its top political leadership 
has internalized the notion that nuclear weapons 
best serve the purposes of deterrence (Perkovich 
1993, 85–104). The view among most of India’s 
civilian national security managers who determine 
policy is that nuclear weapons prevent other nuclear 
weapon powers from making nuclear threats and 
their most purposeful use is to countermand the ef-
fects of blackmail. As India acquired a rudimentary 
nuclear weapons capability in the 1990s, several 
Indian and western scholars justified this crude ca-
pability on grounds that “existential” deterrence was 
sufficient to ward off nuclear blackmail (P erkovich 
1993, 85–104). Post-1998, this Indian belief 
morphed into the doctrine of minimal deterrence 
(Draft Nuclear Doctrine 1999) and more recently 
there are indications that India might ultimately 
adopt a limited deterrence posture (Karnad 2008, 
92–96). Such mutations in policy notwithstand-
ing, Indian decision-makers tend to regard nuclear 
weapons in existential terms. 
Because India was a nuclear fence sitter for nearly 
15 years after it conducted a nuclear test in 1974, 
civilian scientists (nuclear and defense) assumed a 
critical role in the program’s development. During 
these years Indian political leaders sanctioned the 
development of a host of strategic technologies that 
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could eventually be harnessed into a nuclear weap-
ons-related effort. But because there was no imme-
diate requirement for operational systems, technical 
symbolism and demonstration assumed center stage 
in the program (Basrur 2006, 58–75). Like their 
Chinese counterparts, Indian scientists too sought 
to build prototypes to “catch up” with their more ad-
vanced peers in the international system and sought 
to develop technologies as means to keep funds 
flowing into their laboratories. 
Much of this technology development was conducted 
under a regime of severe internal opacity. Although 
India was not a party to the Nuclear Nonprolifera-
tion Treaty (NPT), yet it remained a principal target 
of the treaty-regime for many years. US threats to 
deny India high technology, both military related and 
dual-use, as well constrict its sources of internation-
al finance, acted to push the program u nderground, 
deep into the bowels of the state. Starting in the early 
1980s and until 1998, all information concerning 
the nuclear weapons effort was highly compartmen-
talized and no efforts were made to institutionalize 
the state’s internal monitoring capacity. Thus huge 
technical anomalies crept into the program includ-
ing flaws in warhead designs, which because of the 
current moratorium on testing, can no longer be cor-
rected (Kampani 2014, 79–114; Karnad 2008, 
63–71). This lock-in effect imposes huge design 
constraints on future developments within India’s 
arsenal. 
Finally, until about 2002, the Indian military played 
a marginal role in nuclear planning, which was large-
ly the domain of civilian scientists. This situation is 
analogous to the state of the US nuclear arsenal in its 
early stages from 1945 until 1947–49 (Schlosser 
2013, 202–236). Thus, although India possessed 
nuclear weapons as early as 1995–1996, it did not 
develop the soft operational routines to use its weap-
ons instrumentally until 1999 (Kampani 2014, 
99–104). The Indian government institutionalized 
the participation of the military in the form of the 
Strategic Forces Command (SFC) in 2002. But like 
the Second Artillery in China, until about 2005–
2006, the SFC managed the arsenal but played a 
marginal role in planning for it on the basis of opera-
tional requirements. Much has changed since then. 
However, the path dependency effects of India’s pe-
culiar civil–military relations and the dominant role 
of the civilian scientists have created considerable 
teething problems in the development of robust op-
erational capabilities. 
frOm NuClear SymbOlISm tO OPeratIONS 
Institutional and Organizational Developments
India’s stepping out of the nuclear closet in 1998 
was a game changer. The end of external nuclear 
ambiguity paved the way for the collapse of the re-
gime of internal ambiguity as well. It helped relo-
cate the nuclear weapons program from its narrow 
technical confines and embed it into a broader tem-
plate of institutions, organizations and procedures, a 
process that has given meaning to the idea of force 
employment. 
National security-related institutional reforms in 
India exploded in the aftermath of India’s 1999 
Kargil War3 with Pakistan. The principal vector of 
institutional reform was the Arun Singh ‘Task Force 
on Management of Defense.’ It proposed defense 
reforms in the context of the revolution in military 
affairs and India’s status as a nuclear weapon state. 
The heart of its recommendations concerned the 
creation of an Integrated Defense Staff (IDS) led by 
a Chief of Defense Staff (CDS) at its head to bring 
joint planning and coordination among the armed 
services (Chandra 2005, 49–51; Prakash 2007, 
13–31). Pursuant to the Singh task force’s recom-
mendations, the government instituted the IDS in 
2001. A tri-service SFC to coordinate and manage 
nuclear forces was subsequently instituted within 
the IDS in May 2002 (Sawhney 2004, 10; Karnad 
2008, 94–95). In January 2003 India also made 
public the establishment of a National Command 
Authority (NCA) (CCS 2003).
Since the middle of the last decade, the SFC’s orga-
nizational presence within India’s nuclear planning 
has grown substantially. One of the SFC’s principal 
19
© Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, Oslo 2014. ISSN 1894-4795
IFS Insights 3/2014 China–India nuclear rivalry in the “second nuclear age”
attempts has been to force a change the method-
ology for nuclear force planning from one based on 
heuristics to one based on robust statistical damage 
e xpectancy (DE) estimates (Postol 1987, 379–
380).4 In the pre-SFC era, it is highly likely that 
projections of fissile material availability and crude 
guesstimates for overall systems and pre-launch 
survivability were the basis for force planning. How-
ever, the greater availability of fissile material in the 
aftermath of the 2005 Indo–US nuclear rapproche-
ment and the deeper institutionalization of the SFC 
appear to have changed that reality. Senior SFC 
commanders such as Rear Admiral (retd.) Shankar 
insists, “Everything is numbers based … on opera-
tions research-based probabilistic analysis. The for-
mer is necessary to arrive at facts … in contrast to 
the intuitive gut-instinct analysis of the nuclear sci-
entists, politicians, and their civilian advisors in the 
past” (Shankar 2010).
Nuclear Hardware
Fission weapons are the mainstay of India’s nuclear 
arsenal. These very likely have a yield in the range of 
12–15kt (Tellis 2001, 319–322), although some 
analysts believe that the yield of the fission weap-
ons in India’s inventory could be boosted to 30kt 
(K oithara 2012, 125). Designing reliable boosted 
weapons entails repeated testing and doubts per-
sist that Indian scientists can build and deploy such 
weapons on the basis of a single test with confi-
dence. The proven fission design in India’s inventory 
has a significantly reduced yield-to-weight ratio in 
comparison to the device tested in 1974. It is also 
believed sufficiently light and rugged for delivery by 
combat aircraft and ballistic missiles. During the 
1998 test series, the fission device was the only de-
vice tested in weaponized form (Sharma, Ashraf, and 
Santhanam 2009). 
It is unclear if India has weaponized low-yield fission 
devices in the sub-kiloton range. Such devices are 
ruled out in India’s nuclear doctrine. Statements by 
Indian political leaders and national security man-
agers make clear that India does not view nuclear 
weapons as usable weapons on the battlefield. How-
ever, the question of a proportionate Indian retalia-
tory response or “calibrated deterrence” to limited 
battlefield strikes by Pakistan and China on Indian 
forces persists both within India’s armed forces and 
the strategic community at large. But the Indian 
government has not acknowledged the existence or 
planned use of low-yield nuclear devices. 
India’s claim that it possesses or is capable of de-
ploying thermonuclear and boosted-fission weapons 
has met with enormous skepticism both within the 
country and abroad. Although India’s nuclear es-
tablishment claimed in the immediate wake of the 
1998 nuclear tests that it tested a thermonuclear 
device successfully, those claims were contradicted 
by visual data of the device’s crater morphology, the 
seismic signal from the test series as well as conflict-
ing data claims and makeovers of the data by the 
Indian scientists involved in the tests (Tellis 2001, 
508–519). The nuclear scientists’ claims were also 
disputed by members of India’s own nuclear and 
defense establishment who at one time or another 
were involved with the weapons design, test, and 
data verification programs (Iyengar 2009). 
As stated in the Draft Nuclear Doctrine 15 years ago, 
India remains committed to developing nuclear forc-
es based on “a triad of aircraft, mobile land-based 
missiles and sea-based assets” (NSAB 1999). The 
Indian Air Force has several nuclear-capable aircraft, 
which include the Mirage 2000, the Jaguar, MIG-
27 and Sukhoi-30 MKI. During the 1990s, a small 
number of Mirage 2000s was converted to perform 
nuclear missions (Chengappa 2000, 382–384). 
Several analysts believe that the Sukhoi-30 MKI 
may have also been tailored for nuclear missions al-
though the evidence is conflicted (Acheson 2012). 
The air leg of India’s triad is by far the most flexible 
and reliable, but suffers from penetravity limitations, 
especially in targeting China. Some of the range and 
communications hurdles that impeded the air leg in 
the 1990s have been partially addressed in the last 
decade through the acquisition of mid-air refueling 
systems and airborne early warning aircraft (NDTV 
2012; Defense Industry Daily 2013). 
Since the early 2000s, India’s operational effort has 
shifted to developing and deploying land-based bal-
listic missiles, which afford advantages of longer-
range, easier storage, maintenance and mobility. 
Since then, three variants of the missile, Agni I, II 
and III have been or are in various stages of enter-
ing operational service. Two variants, Agni IV and 
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V, are in the test phase, while Agni IV is in the de-
sign and development phase (Subramaniam 2011; 
Subramaniam and Mallikarjun 2012). The first five 
variants of Agni are all capable of deploying a one-
ton warhead. Agni VI reportedly will have a three-
ton payload capability and will deploy three MIRVed 
warheads (Shukla 2013). 
The Agni I is a 700km road mobile missile. The 
2,000km Agni II is rail mobile although it is also 
available in a road mobile configuration. Both Agni 
I and Agni II have entered production and have 
been tested in an operational configuration by the 
SFC (Indian Express 2011; Mallikarjun 2014). The 
3,500km rail mobile Agni III has completed devel-
opment tests and is in the process of entering op-
erational service (Mallikarjun 2012). The 4,000km 
Agni IV was likely designed to test new technologies 
(PTI 2012). It is not clear if the missile will enter op-
erational service or will only serve as a test vehicle to 
validate technologies that will become incorporated 
into the Agni V and IV. In 2012, DRDO tested the 
5,000km-range Agni V and more tests are planned 
between now and 2015 (Mallikarjun and Subrama-
niam 2012). The Agni VI, currently under develop-
ment, will have the same range as the Agni V, but 
will deliver a heavier payload and incorporate three 
independently targetable warheads (Shukla 2013). 
Like other missiles of the Agni family, it too will be 
road mobile. 
Finally, as first stated in the DND in 1999, India 
remains seriously invested in developing a secure 
sea-based second-strike capability. India’s current 
sea-based capability consists of a small number of 
350km-range Prithvi liquid fuel missiles deployed 
on board two offshore patrol vessels (Koithara 2012, 
137). For reasons of limited range of both the ships 
and the missiles, this force represents a token capa-
bility against Pakistan. However, India will acquire 
a true sea-based deterrent when its planned fleet of 
three SSBNs begins entering service later in this de-
cade and the next. 
The first of these boats, the S-2 is currently undergo-
ing sea-trials. The vessel’s power plant consists of a 
90MW reactor that uses low-enriched uranium. Its 
overall displacement weight is 6,000 tons (Prakash 
2009). The S-2 has four launch tubes for a ballistic 
missile with an estimated range of 700–1000km 
(Sawhney and Shankar, 2012). This missile, vari-
ously known as the K-15, Sagarika and more re-
cently the B-05, has been under development since 
the early 2000s (Bagla 2013). Thus far India’s mis-
sile development agency has only used underwater 
pontoons for test launches of the B-05. 
The S-3 and S-4 will follow the development of the 
S-2. These will incorporate modifications and im-
provements capable of being incorporated within 
the S-2 hull and supported by its power reactor. 
However, they will not incorporate any fundamental 
re-design, which will come in the S-5, the succes-
sor to the S-2 class (Sawhney and Shankar 2012). 
The S-2 is essentially a “technology demonstrator” 
for follow-on systems. Building it and the succes-
sor vessels in its class will help Indian consolidate its 
submarine design building and industrial infrastruc-
ture. Like a carrier task force, however, nuclear sub-
marines have huge operational time lags. Hardware 
acquisition is only tip of the iceberg as it brings with 
it requirements for a large ancillary infrastructure 
for safety, maintenance, refueling, navigation, crew 
training in operations, communications, and nuclear 
launch procedures (Shankar 2012). 
India’s Evolving Operational Idea of Deterrence
The document that best captures Indian thinking on 
the declaratory aspects of nuclear policy is the draft 
nuclear doctrine (DND), which was made public in 
1999. The DND formalized the core elements of 
India’s nuclear posture that were first prepared in 
the early 1990s: NFU, “retaliation only” against the 
use of nuclear weapons, recessed deployment, and 
assertive command and control (Draft Nuclear Doc-
trine 1999). The DND did, however, dilute India’s 
historic and unqualified commitment to the prin-
ciple of NFU against non-nuclear weapon states by 
stating: “India will not resort to the use or threat of 
nuclear use of nuclear weapons against states which 
do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned 
with nuclear weapon powers” (Draft Nuclear Doc-
trine 1999).
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India’s Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS) issued 
a subsequent document on the “operationalization” 
of the nuclear doctrine in January 2003, which re-
moved the above caveat. The new document states: 
“nuclear weapons will only be used in retaliation 
against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on 
I ndian forces anywhere” (CCS 2003). The latter 
clause removed the qualified commitment to NFU. 
However, by including the possibility of nuclear use 
against Indian armed forces anywhere it expanded 
the scope conditions under which India might un-
dertake nuclear retaliation. Further, the January 
2003 document also qualified NFU by stating “in 
the event of a major attack against India or Indian 
forces anywhere by biological or chemical weap-
ons, India will retain the option of retaliating with 
nuclear weapons” (CCS 2003). Observers speculate 
that changes in India’s scope conditions for nuclear 
use are probably (a) a political attempt to extend the 
benefits of deterrence in the widest possible sense of 
term; and (b) the result of social isomorphism where 
Indian doctrine, at least at the level of stated policy, 
has begun to mimic US doctrinal statements (Sagan 
2008, 49). The January 2003 document issued 
by the CCS also expanded the scale conditions of 
India’s retaliatory response. The original DND pro-
posed “punitive” retaliatory attacks, thereby leaving 
open the door for proportionate deterrence or retalia-
tory attacks that were calibrated to match a nuclear 
attack against I ndia. However, the CCS statement 
threatens “massive retaliation” regardless of the 
scale of attacks against India. However, statements 
from senior Indian military leaders suggest that the 
operational reality of India’s nuclear use policy is 
more in line with the original DND (Bhavnani 2009). 
Scholars such as Ashley Tellis and Vipin Narang, 
among others, have argued that Indian planners 
have deliberately eschewed an asymmetric nuclear 
escalation strategy in war because of the structural 
advantages India’s conventional military enjoys vis-
à-vis Pakistan and China as well as the natural de-
fense afforded by the Himalayas in the north (Tellis 
2001, 296–475, X; Narang 2014, 78–95). Indian 
military leaders, however, downplay these structural 
advantages in private. Their opposition to an asym-
metric escalation or a first-use doctrine stems from 
the massively destructive and uncontrollable nature 
of nuclear warfare, which they find impossible to 
relate to any reasonable political objective barring 
the removal of a nuclear threat (Shankar 2010). 
The DND explicitly emphasizes that India would 
maintain “highly effective conventional capabilities” 
to “raise the threshold of outbreak both of conven-
tional military conflict as well as that of threat or use 
of nuclear weapons” (DND 1999). In other words, 
conventional superiority does not inhere by default 
in the Indian state. Building and sustaining it consti-
tute a political choice. The choice that Indian leaders 
have actualized is the avoidance of a conventional 
situation that might potentially force India into a 
nuclear corner. 
This is not to suggest that strategic rationales, more 
specifically India’s local conventional force asym-
metry vis-à-vis Pakistan and China or its favorable 
geography, have no role in the choice of posture. 
However, in most Indian formulations on nuclear-
ization, the deductive logic begins with ethical and 
political rationales and then continues downward to 
recruit strategic arguments as justifications for pos-
ture selection, not the other way around. There is 
some new evidence to suggest, however, that several 
senior military leaders in India oppose NFU (Karnad 
2008, 90–92). But Indian military leaders’ opposi-
tion to NFU stems from a reasoning very different 
from the one rooted in conventional force advantage 
or geography argument. The first line of reasoning is 
political. Its goal is enhancing deterrence optimal-
ity, but only insofar as it concerns preventing nuclear 
use against India, not war in general. This argument 
begins with the operating assumption that “nuclear 
weapons should be treated as political weapons.” 
But “if they are to be treated as political weapons 
then NFU becomes problematic,” because “you 
have to compel, coerce, or threaten…(otherwise) the 
initiative for nuclear use will lie with someone else” 
(Shankar 2010). The second argument has a nar-
rower logistical focus. It stems from the SFC’s or-
ganizational concerns that given the current state 
of I ndia’s recessed capabilities and distributed 
command and control, it might find it hard, if not 
impossible, to mount a credible retaliatory strike in 
the aftermath of absorbing a nuclear strike (Karnad 
2008, 97–98).
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But despite these concerns, there is no overwhelm-
ing pressure within the SFC or from India’s wider 
military leadership to jettison NFU. For one, the SFC 
does not self-identify as a radical force for nuclear 
revisionism. Rather, its leaders envision it as a pro-
fessional body whose “sole objective is operational 
planning to ensure that the arsenal is maintained 
in a state of readiness sufficient to ensure assured 
retaliation” (Bhavnani 2009). They are also aware 
that first-use doctrines generate pressures for pre-
emption, the “use them or lose them” syndrome. 
With tactical nuclear weapons “there is an inbuilt 
propensity to lose control over the escalation pro-
cess. Once the nuclear threshold is crossed, a large-
scale exchange will be likely,” which is something 
they hope to avoid. Finally, they reason that “if there 
is incontrovertible evidence that a nuclear attack is 
imminent, India’s optimal solution would be to pre-
empt using conventional precision strikes” and not 
nuclear means (Shankar 2010). However, this deci-
sion would be best left to political decision-makers 
in the moment of that contingency and is not some-
thing that need concern the determination of India’s 
peacetime posture.
Massive retaliation remains the Indian government’s 
officially declared operational policy. But notwith-
standing this declaration, as Ashley Tellis surmised a 
decade and a half ago, the impending threat of nucle-
ar operations produces a steady pressure downward 
to the lowest possible level of a nuclear exchange 
(Tellis 2001, 363–365). And Indian policy is no 
different. Regardless of India’s public rhetoric of a 
massive retaliatory response to any nuclear, chemi-
cal or biological strike against India, the SFC’s op-
erational plans likely encompass a range of options 
that include nuclear demonstration shots, tactical 
use against military area targets on the conventional 
battlefield, and counter force targets besides large-
scale genocidal counter city attacks. 
SourceS oF StabIlIty and InStabIlIty In the chIna–IndIa  
nuclear relatIonShIP
China and India’s growing rivalry in Asia and de-
velopments in their nuclear arsenals tend to provoke 
alarm. Many scholars and policy analysts correlate 
the growth and modernization of these arsenals to 
the beginnings of a nuclear rivalry reminiscent of the 
one between the US and the former Soviet Union du-
ring the Cold War years. Although India and China 
are not ideological rivals engaged in a life and death 
struggle of the sort that consumed the superpowers, 
observers draw from international relations theory 
and recent history to point to the intensity of geopo-
litical struggles among rising powers, the propensity 
of arms races to assume a life of their own, and secu-
rity dilemmas that produce arms race spirals. More 
specifically, concerns center on China and India’s 
nuclear modernization programs, the participation 
of their militaries in nuclear operations planning, and 
the morphing of their historically restrained nuclear 
use policies and deterrence postures into more ag-
gressive ones. Others, especially regional observers 
from both countries, are more sanguine and do not 
view the nuclear developments in alarmist tones. 
This section evaluates some of the key sources of 
stability and instability in the China–India nuclear 
equation. 
StabIlIty
At the outset, it is evident that China and India are sa-
tiated powers and their competition is nowhere close 
to rivaling the US–Soviet global rivalry during the 
Cold War years. Both states are not only stakehold-
ers in the Western liberal economic order, they also 
share a common interest in sustaining global institu-
tions particularly those related to global governance, 
trade, and financial stability. Their positive agenda of 
revisionism concerns the expansion of their power 
in the United Nations (UN) and global financial in-
stitutions. Thus China seeks to dethrone the dollar 
as the global reserve currency. It seeks greater voting 
rights in the International Monetary Fund (Khong 
2013/2014, 153–175). India similarly has sought 
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a larger role for itself in international institutions 
commensurate with its power (Nonalignment 2.0 
2012, 25–37). On the negative side, their revision-
ism concerns a narrow defense of Westphalian state 
privileges against new international legal doctrines 
of limited sovereignty and humanitarian interven-
tions. Thus both states seek to pursue only partially 
revisionist agendas in the international system and 
the targets of their revisionism are the US and its 
western allies and not themselves. The substance 
of India and China’s rivalry by comparison concerns 
relatively minor territorial adjustments, the security 
of the sea-lanes of communications, and security as-
sistance to third parties. Although significant, these 
issues do not threaten the existential security of ei-
ther state, a condition that keeps nuclear weapons in 
the background. 
There are other structural factors that also remove 
nuclear weapons from the front lines of the China–
India geopolitical competition in Asia. As scholars 
of nuclear posture selection including Narang have 
explained, both China and India are geographi-
cally vast, a condition that provides them “strategic 
depth” against conventional invading armies. States 
with large territories have the luxury of time in con-
ventional wars and can afford to trade space for time 
when confronted with losses and defeat. The same 
does not hold true for small states with limited geo-
graphic depth such as Pakistan and Israel. The latter 
must perforce use or at least threaten to use nuclear 
weapons to stave off defeat as their existential secu-
rity might become at risk early during a conventional 
war (Narang 2014, 78–95). 
States endowed with large populations and well-
endowed conventional militaries are similarly less 
inclined to threaten nuclear use early in war. Both 
China and India meet these second criteria as well. 
Reasons of ideological constraints apart, a powerful 
conventional military incentivize both countries to 
adopt a relaxed NFU nuclear posture. An NFU pos-
ture in turn has other positive effects on nuclear sta-
bility. It permits the disaggregation of arsenals such 
as the Chinese and Indian practices of keeping war-
heads separate from their delivery systems. Arsenals 
need not be maintained on high alert in peacetime 
and dispersed in the field on ever ready. This in turn 
permits the institutionalization of highly centralized 
command and control systems. It also reduces the 
likelihood of accidental nuclear attacks due to false 
alarms or inadvertence. The existence of large and 
powerful conventional militaries thus creates struc-
tural conditions for nuclear stability. 
No doubt, both China’s SAC and India’s SFC are 
critical of the NFU policy. Both militaries would pre-
fer the substitution of minimalist with limited deter-
rence postures. Some observers view these internal 
debates as ominous markers of an ugly nuclear com-
petition and instability to come. However, the evi-
dence suggests that China’s political leadership has 
sought to retain the NFU and minimal deterrence 
postures despite pressures from the PLA (Fravel and 
Medeiros 2010, 78). Chinese nuclear force devel-
opments: the small number of warheads; the likely 
absence of TNWs and enhanced radiation weapons; 
the modest force modernization efforts; weaknesses 
in strategic connectivity; the absence of missile de-
fenses; and other weaknesses relating to intelligence 
and reconnaissance are indicators of the gaps be-
tween the Chinese military’s internal doctrinal de-
bates and China’s actual force capabilities. Although 
the Second Artillery now plays a larger role in shep-
herding China’s nuclear forces, it is only one actor 
in China’s nuclear decision-making process (Fravel 
and Medeiros 2010, 83–84). The position of the 
Indian military is no different. Indian leaders have 
institutionalized the participation of the military in 
nuclear operations planning alongside civilian de-
fense scientists under the leadership of the National 
Security Advisor in the prime minister’s office (S aran 
2013). Policy outcomes in both China and India 
suggest that civilian leaders retain a strong veto over 
unbridled military competition and any changes in 
use and doctrinal postures will likely remain a slow 
process. 
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INStabIlIty
Despite the existence of structural and institution-
al factors that act as restraints on the China–India 
nuclear rivalry in the short term, stability is far from 
assured in the medium and long term. Assured de-
struction stemming from secure second-strike capa-
bilities is broadly accepted as a sine qua non among 
deterrence theorists. China for decades lacked that 
capability against the US and Soviet forces and even 
today remains vulnerable to a US first strike. C hina, 
of course, suffers no such vulnerabilities when it 
comes to regional powers such as India. But like 
the small and crude Chinese arsenal of the decades 
past, India’s nuclear capabilities vis-à-vis China are 
rudimentary. Although India is rapidly developing a 
family of medium and intermediate-range ballistic 
missiles, it does not currently posses the ability to 
hold significant Chinese population and economic 
centers hostage. Indian strike forces also suffer from 
reliability concerns, raising questions about the 
I ndian arsenal’s DE probabilities. Further, an Indian 
submarine-based deterrent capable of threatening 
China will probably take another decade to develop. 
In essence therefore, India does not yet possess the 
technical means that could undergird a regime of 
stable nuclear deterrence with China. 
Emerging and proposed technical developments in 
the Chinese and Indian arsenals also raise ques-
tions whether their currently recessed force postures 
can remain a constant in the future. The principal 
development in this regard is the emergence of a 
submarine-based ballistic missile force. China is 
on the verge of deploying such a force while India 
is in the process of developing one. It is highly un-
likely that the current Chinese and Indian de-mated 
postures involving the separation of warheads from 
delivery systems will survive the transition to a sea-
based system (Lewis 2013, 76; Shankar 2010). 
The separation of delivery systems and their war-
head packages is impossible aboard submarines and 
the transition to sea-based deterrents will undoubt-
edly change the readiness profile of nuclear forces in 
both China and India. Similarly, China and India’s 
deployment of road and rail mobile solid-fuel bal-
listic missiles and their placement in canisters is an 
attempt to improve mobility and survivability. As 
missile systems become more mobile and the mili-
tary organizations manning them more professional, 
pressures will likely grow for ending the institution 
of de-mating as well for replacing physical controls 
with procedural ones. If China and India make this 
institutional transition, a higher readiness posture 
will ensue by default. 
India and China are also developing MARV and 
MIRV technologies and future missile systems 
could deploy multiple warheads alongside decoys. In 
the US and Soviet competition, multiple warheads 
were considered the bane of nuclear instability due 
to their potential for disarming first strikes. As the 
accuracy of Chinese and Indian missile systems 
i mproves alongside real time advances in reconnais-
sance, intelligence gathering, and surveillance capa-
bilities, the potential for splendid first strikes could 
emerge as a theoretical option, especially for China 
in the context of India. India is also exploring missile 
defense technologies and may well deploy a limited 
ballistic missile defense in the future (Narang 2013, 
146–147). A MIRV capability deployed in juxtapo-
sition with a ballistic missile defense would be highly 
unstable and likely trigger demands for technical 
countermeasures as well as an increase in Chinese 
numbers (Fravel and Medeiros 2010, 84–85). 
Gradually, the professional militaries in both coun-
tries have begun playing a more significant role in 
the planning for nuclear operations (Lewis and Xue 
2012; Fravel and Medeiros 2010; Bhavnani 2009; 
Shankar 2010). These plans have inevitable spill-
over effects in force planning. Unlike political leaders 
in the past who reacted to the requirements of de-
terrence instinctively and simplistically, professional 
militaries prefer complex mathematical calculations 
of DE as well as automation to ensure a smooth 
transition from peacetime posture to readiness and 
employment (Johnston 1995; Shankar 2010). Doc-
trinally too, professional militaries generally tend to 
favor more diverse options for war fighting. In the 
minds of military leaders, limited options render de-
terrence more credible and are more likely to achieve 
intra-war deterrence. Chinese and Indian operation-
al nuclear plans perhaps already incorporate some of 
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these approaches and pressures to refine them will 
very likely grow in the future. The net strategic effect 
of these operational changes will be the lowering of 
the bar for nuclear weapons use in the future. 
Finally, China’s refusal to acknowledge India’s 
nuclear status and its continuing assistance to 
P akistan’s nuclear weapons program remain the 
greatest source of instability in the region. During 
the Cold War years, the superpowers kept the lid on 
nuclear tensions via confidence building measures, 
arms control agreements, hotlines, and transparen-
cy. Because of the absence of a dialogue on all things 
nuclear and the high degree of opacity that sur-
rounds the nuclear estates in both countries, China 
and India are unable to replicate many of these insti-
tutions. China’s continuing nuclear relationship with 
Pakistan not only causes grave misgivings in India, 
but could also cause India to proliferate destabiliz-
ing cruise and ballistic missiles to China’s regional 
rivals such as Vietnam. In South Asia in particular, 
P akistan’s internal instability and its leveraging of 
nuclear weapons to resort to asymmetric warfare 
against India poison the latter’s relations with China 
and make the return to normal relations between 
them impossible. 
concluSIon
The China–India rivalry in Asia is an example of 
rivalry-light. Although prone to “security dilemmas,” 
it has none of the existential dilemmas that drove 
rivalries between Britain and Germany at the turn of 
the 19th century or the US–Soviet rivalry in the last 
century. Both China and India are relatively satiated 
powers with marginally revisionist global agendas. 
Their rivalry therefore serves only as a spoiler mech-
anism in the path of their regional ambitions. In this 
regard, India’s potential to stoke a Tibetan uprising 
would more likely distract China’s attention and 
threaten its international reputation. Although this 
would have negative consequences, it is unlikely to 
stall China’s rise as a global power or dominant po-
sition in the western Pacific. Likewise, China’s past 
successes in squandering India’s strategic attention 
notwithstanding, the constraints on the expansion 
of Indian power are domestic and institutional. Like-
wise, China’s two-ocean strategy and forays into the 
Indian Ocean region erode but do not upend the 
IN’s dominant position there. 
The nuclear competition between the two countries 
is a sideshow in this rivalry. For four decades after 
its first nuclear test, India mattered little in China’s 
nuclear calculus, which was largely fixated on north-
east Asia, the United States, and Russia. To the 
extent that India posed any threat, China sought 
to counterbalance it by helping Pakistan acquire 
a nuclear arsenal. India’s emergence as a nuclear 
power in the last decade as well as serious attempts 
to deploy an operational arsenal capable of targeting 
China has inevitably ended Beijing’s policy of splen-
didly ignoring India. Yet, the evidence suggests that 
China has incorporated the new Indian threat into 
its pre-existing nuclear force modernization plans. 
Ironically, although India’s nuclear quest began as 
an attempt to deal with the Chinese threat, new 
evidence shows that Indian leaders have treated 
China with far greater equanimity than is commonly 
believed (Kennedy 2011, 133–134). When India 
revived its nuclear weapons development program 
in 1980–1981, it did so in response to the emerg-
ing threat from Pakistan. For a quarter century, from 
1980 until the middle of the last decade, India’s 
nuclear weaponization and operational planning 
was focused on Pakistan. That focus began to shift 
in the latter half of the last decade less due to any 
new operational nuclear threats from China than 
from I ndia’s imagined role as China’s peer and chief 
rival in Asia and the potential conflict that might 
ensue from that construction. Although India’s 
strategic elites and national security managers now 
point to China as their principal long-term national 
security concern, the pace of India’s nuclear arsenal 
development is generally slow. It is more reflective of 
technical opportunism and self-fulfillment than any 
strategic urgency. 
This generally relaxed pace of the Chinese and I ndian 
nuclear competition might change if geopolitical ten-
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sions between the two countries intensify. C hina’s 
aggressive posturing in the western Pacific and the 
Indian Ocean region might yet persuade I ndia to join 
a US-led coalition of democracies to balance China. 
More recently, however, Chinese leaders have tried 
to court India to prevent that outcome. Indian stra-
tegic elites and national security managers have also 
revealed a preference for “strategic autonomy” over 
bandwagoning with the United States. 
Even should the more worst-case scenarios come to 
pass, however, three characteristics of the nuclear 
arsenal development in both countries – the civil-
ian leaders’ internalization of the logic of the nuclear 
revolution, the dominant role of technologists, and 
the relatively weak role of the militaries – provide 
some reassurance that their competition is unlikely 
to assume the unbridled nature of the former super-
power rivalry. 
noteS
1 Counterforce attacks involve targets of military value including an adversary’s nuclear forces, command, control, 
communications, information and intelligence infrastructure. The goal of counterforce attacks is to disarm an 
adversary by destroying its nuclear forces and minimize the chances of a nuclear retaliatory attack. 
2 In nuclear strategy countervalue targets refers to attacks on an adversary’s cities and civilian population. 
3 The Kargil War between India and Pakistan was triggered by the latter’s incursion and occupation of mountain 
ridgelines on the Indian side of the line of control (LoC) in Kashmir. The war lasted between May and July 1999 
and ended with a Pakistani withdrawal from all positions on the Indian side of the LoC.
4 Damage Expectancy is the product of the probability of target kill, air defense penetravity, pre-launch survivability 
of the weapon system, and its reliability. Among these probabilities, target kill and reliability of the weapon system 
form the core concerns of professional planners. Target kill substantially depends on the nuclear warhead’s yield 
(lethality) and it reliably producing that yield every time it is exploded.
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